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Traditionally different approaches to the study of cognition have been viewed as competing
explanatory frameworks. An alternative view, explanatory pluralism, regards different
approaches to the study of cognition as complementary ways of studying the same
phenomenon, at speciﬁc temporal and spatial scales, using appropriate methodological
tools. Explanatory pluralism has been often described abstractly, but has rarely been
applied to concrete cases. We present a case study of explanatory pluralism. We discuss
three separate ways of studying the same phenomenon: a perceptual decision-making
task (Bahrami et al., 2010), where pairs of subjects share information to jointly individuate
an oddball stimulus among a set of distractors. Each approach analyzed the same corpus
but targeted different units of analysis at different levels of description: decision-making at
the behavioral level, conﬁdence sharing at the linguistic level, and acoustic energy at the
physical level. We discuss the utility of explanatory pluralism for describing this complex,
multiscale phenomenon, show ways in which this case study sheds new light on the
concept of pluralism, and highlight good practices to critically assess and complement
approaches.
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INTRODUCTION
Behavioral and cognitive processes are complex phenomena span-
ning multiple scales of organization, which may require multiple
approaches to be fully understood. However, researchers have
often aimed for a singular, unifying paradigm in the study of
cognition (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Port and Van Gelder, 1995). The
“paradigm wars” in cognitive science originated in the notion that
one, or perhaps a limited number, of theoretical accounts will turn
out to be most appropriate for the study of cognition. Herein, we
will argue that multiple approaches should be used to study cog-
nition at different scales of analysis. We consider a speciﬁc case
study in detail, and show how, in practice, distinct methodological
tools can be used to understand the same phenomenon in greater
detail than any single paradigm could alone.
We begin this article by reviewing the history of reduction-
ism and anti-reductionism. We then describe a third intermediate
view, explanatory pluralism, which advocates the complementary
use of more than one perspective at once, and has emerged as a
way of studying complex systems in physics, biology, and other
areas (Dale et al., 2012). This view, we argue, is especially well
suited to the study of multiscale behavioral and cognitive phe-
nomena (Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010; Kello et al., 2010; Dixon et al.,
2012). We identify two beneﬁts from practicing explanatory plu-
ralism – top-down constraining and bottom-up scaffolding – and
illustrate them through a case study of explanatory pluralism. We
describe three empirical investigations of the same phenomenon
at different levels of analysis, and from different theoretical per-
spectives. We end by considering how to critically assess and
complement approaches, what is gained in this case by the pluralist
approach, and what would be lost by more traditional reductive
and non-reductive approaches.
MULTISCALE NATURE OF COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL
PHENOMENA
A clear example of the need for a plurality of approaches is to
be found in the multiscale nature of cognitive and behavioral
processes. Visual recognition happens through rapid millisec-
ond dynamics of neural population codes in the brain (Mauk
and Buonomano, 2004). However, precisely the way this hap-
pens is shaped on the longer timescales of ontogenesis and
cultural evolution. For instance, sensitivity to certain color distinc-
tions seems largely inﬂuenced by linguistic inheritance (Roberson
et al., 2005; Winawer et al., 2007) and even the famous Müller-
Lyer illusion has been found to be modulated by the saliency
of carpentered corners in a given culture and environment:
infants growing up in some cultures will be more prone to per-
ceive all angles as square corners distorted by distance (Henrich
and McElreath, 2003; Henrich et al., 2010). It is increasingly
acknowledged that cognitive and behavioral phenomena gener-
ally involvemultiple temporal and spatial scales (e.g., Newell, 1994;
Dale et al., 2012).
As a working deﬁnition, we can deﬁne the scale of a method
as the set of units typically used in analyses. On this deﬁni-
tion the temporal scale of neural activity tends to emphasize a
milliseconds-to-seconds range, while the temporal scale of geol-
ogy tends to emphasize a kiloannums-to-gigannums (thousands to
billions of years) range (cf. Newell’s “Bands of Cognition”: Newell,
1994). The spatial scale of a discipline or method relative to a
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phenomenon can be deﬁned in a similar way. Neuroscience works
mainly in the nanometer-to-centimeter scale, while ecology con-
siders environments on a meter-to-kilometer scale. It has to be
noted that a discipline or method can consider multiple spatial
and or temporal scales, as well as relations between them: ecolo-
gists, for example, sometimes consider the relationship between
relatively low-level chemical processes in the soil of a region and
higher-level processes like the viability of species in that region;
and of course, physics considers everything from the smallest
scales of particle physics to the largest scales of the cosmos as a
whole.
A prime example of a complex, multiscale cognitive and behav-
ioral phenomenon is human language (Beckner et al., 2009). Units
of language such as phonemes, syllables, words, phrases, texts,
and discourse exist at distinct scales. They are studied at corre-
sponding temporal and spatial scales, from raw acoustic energy
patterns unfolding in the milliseconds range, to larger structures
encompassing minutes, hours, and even days. The range extends
further still, to the slower pace of language change and evolu-
tion that occurs over years and centuries. These different scales
are studied using a variety of different frameworks and methods,
including Fourier analysis, Markov chain analyses, discrete- and
continuous-unit power law analyses, and for language in particu-
lar, corpusmethods and semantic analyses. Linguistic behavior has
been shown to be systematically organized across multiple time
scales. Phonological distributions, word frequencies in a given
language, and sequences of words in texts all follow power law dis-
tributions, where the frequencies of a given unit are in proportion
across multiple scales of analysis (e.g., Zipf, 1949; Ferrer i Cancho
et al., 2004; Kello and Beltz, 2009; Altmann et al., 2012).
As a consequence, we argue that no cognitive or behavioral phe-
nomenon can be exhaustively described by reference to a single
temporal or spatial scale or theoretical framework. The ques-
tion thus should not be which one scale of analysis or which one
theoretical framework is the right one to target and study for a
given phenomenon. Rather, the issue is which scales and which
theoretical frameworks are relevant for the question at hand, and
how they relate to each other. This is the essence of the position
called “explanatory pluralism.” The alternative and more tradi-
tional account, which we delineate in more detail below, would be
to focus on one scale of analysis and/or one theoretical framework
for each given scale of phenomena.
EXPLANATORY PLURALISM
Contemporary philosophy of science grew out of the logical
positivist movement of the 1920s, according to which the only
meaningful statements are those that can be empirically veriﬁed.
Psychology, for example, was taken to be meaningful only insofar
as its statements could be translated in to the veriﬁable statements
of a physical language (Carnap, 1959), and in that sense reduced to
physics. This kindof view ran into various problems (e.g., the prin-
ciple of veriﬁcation seems to be meaningless according to its own
criteria)1, but the overarching project persisted: to understand in
1The argument does not go through quite so easily, but there are still numerous
problems with logical positivism and empiricism. For a detailed history and review,
see Creath (2011) and Dienes (2008).
a formally rigorous way what science is and how different sciences
are related to each other.
A standard view among the logical positivists, which remained
even after positivism went out of fashion, was reductionism
(Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958; Nagel, 1961; Cat, 2013 for
review). According to the standard “layer cake” version of reduc-
tionism, higher-level “special sciences” (e.g., chemistry, biology)
are arranged into a hierarchy, from physics to sociology, with
physics at the bottom. It was thought that all the statements of
any sciences besides physics could be reduced to the statements
of the next lower level science via a system of “bridge laws.”
For example, one might assume that sociology would reduce to
psychology, psychology would reduce to biology, biology would
reduce to chemistry, and chemistry would reduce to physics. In
this way, all empirical claims could ultimately be reduced to the
laws of physics. This was the “reductionist” consensus until about
40 years ago2. It was also known as the “unity of science” view3.
The more radical proponents of reductionism were also “elim-
inativists,” who thought that, in light of ongoing reductions, all
special sciences (psychology, economics, etc.) would be elimi-
nated. In the end we would only need physics, because the other
sciences are really just describing physical stuff using labels and
other descriptive conveniences.
In the early 1970s the reductionist consensus cameunder attack.
Fodor (1974), in an inﬂuential paper subtitled “the disunity of sci-
ence,” challenged reductionism by arguing that, even if it is true
that nature is in some sense organized hierarchically, with fun-
damental particles aggregating into larger and larger systems of
particles, this does not entail that higher level “special sciences”
will be eliminated or reduced. The special sciences are, for Fodor,
not eliminable; they are “autonomous.” The reason is that higher-
level theoretical vocabularies do not line up in tidy one-to-one
ways with lower level theoretical vocabularies, the way the bridge-
law approach suggested. A term like “desire” does not correspond
one-to-one to a “natural kind”of neuroscience, since it is multiply
realized in different kinds of organisms. Thus “desire” is a propri-
etary term of a distinctive science, psychology, which cannot be
eliminated. Fodor’s argument and other similar arguments (e.g.,
Davidson, 1969; see Cat, 2013 for review) were highly inﬂuential,
and “non-reductive physicalism”became the new consensus for at
least a decade.
A key feature of non-reductive-physicalism was the idea that,
in practice, autonomous special sciences need not interact with
lower-level sciences. Economists don’t need to understand quan-
tum ﬁeld theory in order to study labor markets, even though
labor markets are physical systems that obey the laws of funda-
mental physics. In fact, it would be a mistake, a waste of time, for
an economist to consider such low-level phenomena. In a similar
way, Fodor claims, psychology should describe laws of behavior
2Reductionism (as well as anti-reductionism and other positions we consider) can
be understood as ontological or epistemological theses. As an ontological thesis,
reductionism, for example, corresponds to the physicalist claim that there is noth-
ing over and above physical entities. Our emphasis here is on the epistemological
theses, which concern (for example) whether and to what extent knowledge and
understanding at higher levels requires knowledge andunderstanding at lower levels.
3The concept of unity was actually understood in several, subtly different ways. See
Cat (2013).
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and cognition without wasting time on the low-level “implemen-
tation details” of neuroscience4. So non-reductive physicalism is
associated with a kind of theoretical segregationism or “siloism”
(our term), whereby different sciences are different levels, which
maintain a principled isolation from one another.
So we have two views: (1) reductionism, where all special sci-
ences reduce to physics, so that (in extreme eliminativist forms
of this view) all sciences can in principle be eliminated except
physics, and (2) anti-reductionism, where special sciences remain
autonomous, and (in extreme “siloist” forms of this view) need
not consult one another to do their work.
Explanatory pluralism is an intermediate third view, where spe-
cial sciences are taken to be semi-autonomous (Edelman, 2008;
Dale et al., 2009; de Jong, 2010; Hotton and Yoshimi, 2010;
Yoshimi, 2012)5. On this view, different sciences have a degree
of autonomy (they are not to be eliminated), but also interact in
an effort to understand physical reality at different scales (they are
not fully autonomous silos). According to the form of pluralism
we advocate, different sciences and theoretical approaches should
maintain their emphasis on different proprietary scales but should
also work to unify their work as much as possible, insofar as they
often describe the same phenomena in different but compatible
ways.
Consider the old story about the blind men and an elephant
(Saxe, 1884). Each of a group of blind men feels a different part of
an elephant and then comes up with an incomplete, incompatible
account of it.
Six blind men encounter an elephant. Each feels a different
part, and infers from the properties of the portion encountered
the nature of the whole (one feels the tusk and concludes that he
has encountered a spear, another feels the trunk and deduces that
hehasmet a snake, etc.). It is often suggested thatwe are in the same
4Fodor’s claim is that, assuming that a given pair of sciences (e.g., psychology and
neuroscience) “cross-classify” the same phenomena, in the sense that they introduce
predicates that do not map 1-to-1 onto each other (there is no isomorphism or set of
“lawful coextensions”between them), then in practice it does not make sense for the
two theories to interact (see Fodor, 1974, p. 113). Fodor clearly thinks it is a mistake
to encourage cross-level interaction in the case of psychology and neuroscience:
he bemoans the very idea of what would today be called “cognitive neuroscience”:
“There are departments of ‘psycho-biology’ and ‘psychology and brain sciences’ in
universities throughout the world whose very existence is an institutionalized gam-
ble that lawful co-extensions can be found” (Fodor, 1974, p. 105). Such attempts are
“foredoomed.” In another text Fodor and Pylyshyn argue at length against “brain-
style modeling” in the cognitive sciences, and again treat it as a mistake, which they
trace back to Lucretius: “the structure of ‘higher levels’ of a system are rarely isomor-
phic, or even similar, to the structure of ‘lower levels’ of a system. No one expects
the theory of protons to look very much like the theory of rocks and rivers, even
though, to be sure, it is protons and the like that rocks and rivers are ‘implemented
in’. Lucretius got into trouble precisely by assuming that there must be a simple
correspondence between the structure of macrolevel and microlevel theories. . .it
seems that the commitment to ‘brain style’modeling leads to many of the character-
istic Connectionist claims about psychology, and that it does so via the implicit and
unwarranted-assumption that there ought to be similarity of structure among the
different levels of organization of a computational system.” (Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988, p. 63). Though Fodor clearly abides by some kind of disciplinary isolation
principle in such cases, subsequent non-reductive physicalists did not uniformly
follow him in this (see, e.g., Sober, 1999).
5There are differences between these views, but our focus here is on a generic form
of explanatory pluralism which captures the general idea that no one science is
proprietary and that multiple sciences are needed to understand physical reality in
all its complexity.
position with respect to consciousness: different (even incompat-
ible) theories may be derived from correct, but incomplete, views
of reality. (Sloman and Chrisley, 2003, p. 4)
But with a little collaboration they can recognize that they
are describing the same thing in different ways, and thereby
collectively contribute to a fuller understanding of their target
phenomenon.
Within cognitive science, variants of this pluralistic theme have
a history, even if not by name. The concept of distinct “levels
of analysis” goes back at least to Marr (1982), with his famous
explanatory hierarchy of the computational, algorithmic, and
implementational levels; each level with its own focused program
of investigation. However, Marr’s (1982) work was appropri-
ated by Fodor and others to support strong forms of autonomy,
which discourage interaction between theories at different levels.
Just as software engineers don’t need to understand the imple-
mentation details of the computer that runs the algorithms they
write, so too psychologists don’t need to understand the neural
hardware that implements the algorithms and computations they
describe6.
Approaches advocating more pluralistic interactions between
theories emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, as researchers
began to develop ways of unifying connectionist and symbolic
approaches to cognition in common frameworks (e.g., Smolen-
sky, 1988; Bechtel, 1990). More recently, a variety of theorists
have developed frameworks for integrating different approaches
to cognition. One example is the area of symbolic dynamics,
where the lower-level dynamics of a system can be “coarse-
grained” (multiple states at a lower level are treated as a single
state at a higher level) and thereby analyzed in terms of dis-
crete computational states (Dale and Spivey, 2005; Edelman, 2008;
Yoshimi, 2010). These types of approaches allow researchers to
study systems using multiple theoretical frameworks (e.g., dynam-
ical systems theory and ﬁnite automata theory), but also to
study the relationship between these theories (e.g., Crutchﬁeld,
1994; Shalizi and Crutchﬁeld, 2001; beim Graben and Potthast,
2009; Atmanspacher, 2011; Butterﬁeld, 2011; Yoshimi, 2012;
Dale and Vinson, 2013)7.
Explanatory pluralism does not imply the anarchistic idea that
“anything goes”8: often, more than one approach is needed, but
not all approaches are equally motivated, and many are even not
warranted. If two approaches contribute the same (or largely cor-
related) information about a phenomenon, they should be treated
as competing alternatives. In such a case, either one will pro-
duce a better explanation (and the other is a mere symptom,
6We would not subscribe to this view of the relationship between software and
hardware, at least in purist terms.
7Within pluralism, we ﬁnd that explanatory pluralism and truth pluralism have
potentially interesting relationships. For example, Lynch (2001) provides argu-
ments for ametaphysical pluralism countering questions of absolutism. Considering
our proposal for an explanatory pluralism that sits between reductionist and anti-
reductionist views, there is room for ample discussion on how epistemic and
ontological pluralism can ﬁt together. We hold our views on the matter for a future
paper, as we consider this important topic to be out of the scope of the current
paper.
8Cf. Feyerabend (1975)“. . .there is only one principle that can be defended under all
circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything
goes.”
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 330 | 3
Abney et al. Case study in explanatory pluralism
which can be discarded), or it might turn out that they are
both driven by a third factor that needs to be identiﬁed. A crit-
ical criterion for explanatory pluralism is thus that the multiple
approaches should not only be motivated by complementary per-
spectives, but should also contribute different and independent
(minimally correlating) information about the subject matter.
The cumulative addition of approaches to a research question
is only justiﬁed to the extent that each new approach enables
the researcher to account for new aspects of the phenomenon
that would be inaccessible given other approaches. Comparisons
between approaches are also necessary in order to assess their
reciprocal productivity and explanatorypower. This canbedone in
at least three often related ways: (1) through a conceptual analysis
of the approaches involved, (2) through a data-driven statistical
model comparison, and (3) through a more direct experimen-
tal manipulation of the factors involved, aimed at disentangling
the reciprocal role of the mechanisms suggested by the different
models.
The current case study is an example of a conceptual analysis of
explanatory pluralism. In this case there is no explicit model ﬁtting
or experimentation across levels, but rather a theoretical analysis
of how multiple independently motivated analyses of the target
phenomenon, framed at different temporal and spatial scales, are
related to one another. If the role of the scientist is to investigate,
observe, and continually add to explanations of phenomena, it
seems obviously valuable to show how multiple observations and
theories, despite differences in method and scale, can be comple-
mentary. A conceptual analysis can take different forms depending
on the speciﬁc features (e.g., types of analysis) of the theories
being integrated. The main idea is that there is a synthesis of
results from various levels of analysis. The way to go about syn-
thesizing depends in part on the type of analytic practice involved
in the theories being synthesized, which we discuss later in this
section.
A more direct way of applying explanatory pluralism is by
using data-driven analysis. This requires the utilization of model-
ﬁtting procedures (e.g., stepwise linear regression indices such as
adjusted R-squared, log-likelihood, AIC, BIC; see Schwarz, 1978;
Hastie et al., 2009; see also Myung and Pitt, 1997) and, most
importantly, commensurate units of data from multiple levels of
analysis. Under this strategy, the question becomes: how much
variance of the phenomenon does each level of analysis explain?
Although this strategy might seem to be most optimal for “com-
patible” (Giere, 2004) levels of analysis, issues of measurement
error and methodological assumptions can become limiting fac-
tors that need to be addressed. Related to data-driven practice
is the experimental practice of carefully manipulating parame-
ters in order to discriminate between “causal” roles of different
mechanisms9.
The third approach – designing experiments to test competing
theories – is quite common in the realmof cognitive psychology, in
which behavioral data can be leveraged against theoretical sticking
points. By directly testing the predictions of potentially competing
theories, an experimenter might conﬁrm one theory or disconﬁrm
9Both these latter practices could be proﬁtably applied to the case in analysis, but
escape the scope of the current paper.
another. This strategy is perhaps the most common approach to
the theoretical sticking points in cognitive science. Famous recent
examples include the “past-tense debate” (Pinker and Ullman,
2002) in psycholinguistics, or “prototypes vs. exemplars” in cate-
gorization research (Rouder and Ratcliff, 2006), in which dozens
if not hundreds of empirical papers have explored these topics. In
general, however, the degrees of freedom available to a theory, and
to an experimenter, make it very difﬁcult to develop “critical tests”
and the weight of evidence on one side or the other has to grad-
ually accumulate. Incidentally, neither of the vigorously pursued
debates cited in this paragraph has been resolved to consensus, but
integrative approaches have indeed been proposed for some (e.g.,
Love et al., 2004).
Explanatory pluralism affords the scientist a method for devel-
oping fuller explanations of relevant phenomena. The question
then becomes how to apply explanatory pluralism in practice. In
practice, what techniques are available for analyses and expla-
nations of a phenomenon that exists at multiple temporal and
spatial scales? Though there is no universally agreed upon model
of explanation (Woodward, 2009), we can make a start by describ-
ing several speciﬁc approaches to explanatory pluralism: top-down
constraining and bottom-up scaffolding.
Top-down constraining affords the scientist a basis for unify-
ing multiple levels of analysis by identifying longer-scaled levels
as contextual constraints for the smaller-scaled levels. For example,
the amount of phonetic convergence (Pardo, 2006) – the phe-
nomenon where the phonetic properties of interlocutors tend to
align over the course of an interaction – depends on the contex-
tual properties such as participant role and sex of the dyad. The
contextual properties, such as the role of a participant in a conver-
sational task, constrain behaviors occurring at shorter timescales
such as the phonetic repertoire of interlocutors. We are not assert-
ing a problematic “downward causality,” but rather are describing
a pattern of scientiﬁc practice. We are advocating that scientists
identify and analyze the different types and levels of contextual
inﬂuences on a phenomenon.
Bottom-up scaffolding provides a framework for identifying
what can emerge from lower-level patterns (i.e., patterns existing at
shorter time scales or smaller spatial scales), and the dynamics and
processes by which these patterns are formed. It is the substrates of
lower levels that allow higher-level phenomena to emerge. As with
top-downconstraining,weneednot assert anykindof problematic
cross-level causality. Bottom-up scaffolding provides the scientists
with a means of expressing how (for example) symmetries at lower
levels must be broken for distinct phenomena at higher levels to
occur (Kugler and Shaw, 1990).
These ideas are inspired by the heuristic identity theory (HIT)
proposed by McCauley and Bechtel (2001). In this theory, pro-
cesses of bridging across levels of explanation are not a matter
of simplistic isomorphism between laws, or mappings between
ontologies. Instead, mapping across levels should create mutual
constraint, in that levels should be consistent, if qualitatively,
with each other. Mapping should also generate new questions,
as each level may inspire new lines of investigation in the
other. These two beneﬁts of heuristic mapping may guide an
eventual synergy between levels of analysis. “They enable sci-
entists working at one analytical level to exploit the conceptual,
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theoretical, and methodological and evidential resources available
at another.” (p. 743). HIT embraces both streams of inﬂuence
proposed here: from top-down constraints and from bottom-up
scaffolding.
Despite all this theoretical work supporting explanatory plu-
ralism, there have been few if any detailed studies of speciﬁc
cases. We ﬁll this gap by considering a speciﬁc case in detail.
In the case we consider, multiple frameworks are used to ana-
lyze the same data: a corpus of conversing individuals solving
a joint decision-making task (Bahrami et al., 2010). We discuss
three approaches: a systemic approach at the timescale of ∼60–
90 min in which the entire sequence of joint decisions is analyzed
for its statistical properties, a lexical approach emphasizing the
words spoken in the conversation at the timescale of minutes,
and a physical approach focusing on the multiple time-scales of
micro and macro coordination as expressed by the timescale of
acoustic energy of participants’ speech events. Each approach is
born from very different theoretical assumptions, and focuses on
a different scale using different theoretical and methodological
tools. No single approach fully encompasses the phenomenon of
joint decision-making. However, by taking all three approaches
into account, we argue, joint decision-making is understood in a
more articulated way than if it were studied at just one scale or
using just one methodology. This is our notion of explanatory
pluralism: the synergy of multiple theoretical frameworks target-
ing various scales of analysis in the investigation of a particular
phenomenon10.
CASE STUDY: JOINT DECISION-MAKING
Most of us must work in groups to complete complex tasks such
as organizing conference symposia and collaborating on research
projects; the production of this manuscript is one such example.
In the past decade, a substantial research literature has emerged
focusing on the cognitive, neurocognitive, behavioral, and physio-
logical effects of working collectively in pairs or groups (for reviews
see Fusaroli et al., in press; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Shockley
et al., 2009; Cooke et al., 2012). However, there is still much debate
about whether individuals perform better than pairs or groups,
and if so, how and under which conditions (e.g., Rajaram and
Pereira-Pasarin, 2010).
Bahrami et al. (2010) recently developed a paradigm for study-
ing collective perceptual decision-making that begins to address
questions of joint perceptual performance. The paradigm was
inspired by models of sensory integration that address how indi-
viduals integrate information from different sensory modalities
(Ernst andBanks, 2002). Their goalwas to test the question:Would
two people be able to integrate their perceptual information, as
individuals integrate information from different senses, in order
to optimize their decisions? In other words, would two heads be
better than one, and in particular, better than the best individual
performance in a pair? They found that when two people were
given the opportunity to communicate freely about their level
10Our review is inevitably selective. However, there are many variants of a pluralistic
approach to science and cognition, in various domains, including: Abrahamsen and
Bechtel (2006), Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2009), Dennett (1991), Dupré
(1993), Eliasmith (1996), Kellert et al. (2006), Kelso and Enstrøm (2006), Mitchell
(2003), Weiskopf (2009), among others.
of conﬁdence on a trial-by-trial basis, two heads became better
than one. However, this collaborative beneﬁt was dependent on
the interlocutors being equally good at solving the task on their
own: differently performing interlocutors would not beneﬁt from
collaboration.
We argue that this joint decision-making paradigm provides a
concrete case study for assessing explanatory pluralism. The three
studies discussed are semi-autonomous in that they originate from
disparate theoretical perspectives and focus on very different time
scales, but at the same time complement each other, increasingly
building an understanding of how and when interlocutors gain a
collaborative beneﬁt.
APPROACH 1: BEHAVIORAL/DECISION-MAKING (Bahrami et al., 2010)
In the original study (Bahrami et al., 2010), dyads were given a
perceptual oddball task. The participants were recorded while sit-
ting in front of their own respective screen at right angles to each
other in a darkened room. The screenswere identical anddisplayed
exactly the same video output. On each trial the participants were
sequentially shown two 85 ms long visual displays containing six
Gabor patches. One of the displays would contain a contrast odd-
ball: one of the six Gabor patches would have a stronger contrast
and therefore look slightly darker (Figure 1).
The strength of the contrast varied randomly across trials. The
participantswere instructed to individually and separately indicate
which of the displays contained this contrast oddball, by pressing
a button. As long as both participants gave the same answer they
would automatically proceed to the next individual trial. However,
if their individual choices disagreed, they were prompted to nego-
tiate, by freely discussing with each other, a joint decision. There
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup (adopted with permission from
Fusaroli et al., 2012). (A)The experimental setup. (B) Schematic illustration
of a typical trial.
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was no time or other constraint on the joint decision dialogs.
Individual and collective accuracy were then calculated by ﬁt-
ting a psychometric function to the dyad data11. The beneﬁt of
collaborating was then computed as the ratio between collective
accuracy and the individual accuracy of the better of the two
individuals.
Bahrami et al. (2010) used the empirical data thus produced to
compare four models of information processing and transfer, each
emphasizing different components of sensory processing, joint
decisions, and communication: decision-making as relying on (1)
a coin ﬂip, (2) prioritizing the most perceptually competent group
member’s decision, (3) the sharing of conﬁdence on the individual
decisions, and (4) the sharing of the full perceptual information
on the stimulus. The best explanation for the empirical data was
model 3 – the weighted sharing of conﬁdence on the individ-
ual decisions. However, the collaborative beneﬁt was dependent
on similarity of individual sensitivities to the stimuli contrasts:
in other words, differently performing interlocutors would not
beneﬁt from collaboration.
From our perspective, the approach employed by Bahrami
et al. (2010) required the coarse-grained aggregation of behaviors
from every trial: The overall unit of analysis was the psychome-
tric function calculated on the full sequence of joint decisions
per each individual and per each pair. Finding that “two heads
were better than one” required the aggregation of local behavioral
responses (decision-making) into the global perceptual sensitiv-
ity – operationalized as the estimated psychometric functions for
each individual and each dyad.
Aggregating over the dynamics of a given decision process is
common to theoretical approaches in cognitive science. Indeed,
testing the predictions of some theories requires such aggrega-
tion of outcomes, rather than of processes. Consider, for example,
Bayesian accounts of cognition (Chater and Oaksford, 2003, 2008;
Chater et al., 2006). Bayesian approaches consider distributions
over potential decisions or states; the only way this can be achieved
is by aggregating a large number of decisions or behaviors and
characterizing their distribution. By doing so, we are able to use
the Bayesian framework to predict the longer-term properties of
a decision process, and assess whether that process obeys certain
principles of rationality or optimality. In this way, the Bayesian
approach and associated behavioral methods target speciﬁc levels
of analysis, e.g., the purposive/computational of Marr’s levels.
The thesis of the original Bahrami et al. (2010) paper has these
same properties. In order to assess the overall optimality of a
joint decision process, we must aggregate over perceptual deci-
sions. The underlying dynamics of the decision process (which
we consider below) seem less relevant here; we want to know
whether participants were interacting, and whether the presence
of interaction (as a discrete variable) shaped their joint accu-
racy in interesting ways. Put simply, these questions require us
to point to certain aspects of a task, aggregate over these decisions,
11Psychometric functions were computed by plotting the proportion of trials in
which the oddball match was reported in the second interval, as a function of the
contrast difference with the surrounding patch array. The functions were ﬁt with a
cumulative Gaussian function. The slope of each function provided an estimate of
perceptual sensitivity: the steeper the slope, the higher the sensitivity.
and assess the outcome of our analyses with respect to predic-
tions from these frameworks. See Figure 2 for a diagram of the
Bahrami et al. (2010) paradigm, which shows how different lev-
els of the task are studied by the different approaches considered
here.
APPROACH 2: LINGUISTIC/CONFIDENCE (Fusaroli et al., 2012)
The second study we discuss had a very different starting point.
During conversation, interlocutors have been observed to align
to each other’s linguistic behaviors (Pickering and Garrod, 2004;
Fusaroli and Tylén, 2012). The degree of linguistic alignment
has been shown to have functional value; for example, high
linguistic alignment tends to assist in some contexts of prob-
lem solving (Garrod and Anderson, 1987; Garrod and Doherty,
1994). However, it is disputable whether linguistic alignment
is always beneﬁcial and in what ways (for instance the extreme
case of echolalia, where one interlocutor simply repeats what the
other says, does not seem to be an effective conversational strat-
egy; Fusaroli et al., 2014). Fusaroli et al. (2012) re-analyzed the
Bahrami et al. (2010) experiment to explicitly investigate differ-
ences in conversational strategies employed by well- and poorly
performing dyads. The aim was to map which aspects of lin-
guistic alignment were functional for group performance in the
joint decisions. This perspective required a ﬁner-grained look
at the actual process of decision-making, and not just on its
results.
The videos of the joint decision-making tasks were transcribed.
Following on Bahrami et al.’s (2010) insights that conﬁdence shar-
ing is crucial to effectively solve the task, the transcripts were coded
for participants’ spontaneous ways of sharing conﬁdence linguis-
tically, for instance through expressions such as “I think I saw
something.” Across the 16 dyads analyzed, 35 types of such con-
ﬁdence expressions were identiﬁed, e.g., modulations of “to see”
as opposed to “to be sure.” Distributional patterns and token fre-
quencies for each type of conﬁdence expression were quantiﬁed
in each transcript. Local linguistic alignment was calculated for all
lexical items as the transitional probability of any given expression
used by one participant being used by the other participant in the
preceding joint decision. For example, local linguistic alignment
was computed as the probability of Participant B using the expres-
sion “to see” when Participant A used the same expression in the
previous trial.
By having indices of different types of linguistic alignment –
one type that subsumes all lexical expressions (indiscriminate
alignment) and one that subsumes only conﬁdence expressions
(discriminant alignment) – Fusaroli et al. (2012) were able to
determine which type of alignment beneﬁtted joint decision-
making: task-speciﬁc, discriminate alignment or general, indis-
criminate alignment. To measure the lasting effects of alignment,
Fusaroli et al. (2012) also calculated a more coarse-grained mea-
sure of global linguistic convergence of conﬁdence expressions.
This was computed as the percentage of the overall sum of
conﬁdence tokens used by the dyad throughout the experi-
ment, which belonged to the most frequent conﬁdence type thus
abstracting from the local linguistic exchanges between inter-
locutors and focusing on long term linguistic consistency of the
pair.
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FIGURE 2 |The three approaches to decision-making paradigm discussed here, with an indication of their characteristic temporal and spatial scales
as well as their favored methodological tools.
Relying on Bahrami et al.’s (2010) psychometric function for
calculating collective performance, Fusaroli et al. (2012) observed
that task-speciﬁc, local linguistic alignment and global linguistic
convergence positively correlated with collective beneﬁt, whereas,
local indiscriminate alignment negatively correlatedwith collected
beneﬁt. Furthermore, global convergence strongly predicted col-
lective beneﬁt: when dyads continually and consistently used
shared sets of linguistic expressions for expressing conﬁdence, col-
lective beneﬁt was observed to be higher. Fusaroli et al. (2012)
concluded that in order for dyad members to beneﬁt from coop-
eration they should not just parrot each other (indiscriminate
alignment). Rather dyads that jointly adapted linguistic tools
to meet the functional affordances of the task (sharing and
comparing conﬁdence) reached high collective performance.
Summing up, the search for functional linguistic alignment
led Fusaroli et al. (2012) to conduct a corpus analysis of trial-to-
trial transcripts highlighting the actual communication strategies
employed to solve the joint decision task. Computing the transi-
tional probabilities of lexical alignment required a ﬁne-grained
analysis of the local dynamics of lexical choices – the unit of
analysis being lexical expressions within adjacent joint decisions –
keeping track of individuals’ productions. It has to be noted that
coarse-grained analyses were also crucial for the study: global
linguistic convergence, collective beneﬁt and even the aggregate
measures of linguistic alignment to be used as dyad-level corre-
lates for collective beneﬁt. Importantly, the aggregation procedure
applies at a different level of the analysis – at the ﬁner-grained
timescale of words being used by interlocutors.
As described above, aggregation in Bahrami et al. (2010)
derived from a desire to quantify coarser-grained characteristics
of the decision process: psychophysical sensitivity and the beneﬁts
of interaction. The Fusaroli et al. (2012) study provided insight
into the mechanism and process of collective beneﬁt, whereas the
Bahrami et al. (2010) study provided a description of why these
mechanisms work in a particular way. But, as discussed in back-
ground sections above, every theory has boundary conditions that
limit the claims it can make about complex systems. Put simply,
the aggregation approach is unable to specify both how and why
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the content or structure of an interaction helps joint decisions.
Trying to get at these new aspects invokes more dynamic linguis-
tic and psycholinguistic theoretical machinery, quickly leading to
new questions and different levels of analysis. Instead of aggre-
gating decisions alone, we “peel back” those decisions and peer
into their contents, before aggregating in different ways from
before.
APPROACH 3: PHYSICAL/ACOUSTIC ENERGY (Fusaroli et al., 2013)
Recent work on “complexity matching” in the ﬁeld of statistical
physics has shown that information transmission between two
complex systems is optimal when the complexities of the behav-
iors of the two systems match (West et al., 2008). Fusaroli et al.
(2013) investigated whether such ideas would apply to human
interactions (see also Abney et al., under review). Indeed, it has
been shown that humans produce behaviors with long-range cor-
relations at increasing time scales, and additionally, behaviors are
observed to follow scaling laws evidenced by heavy-tailed distri-
butions (Kello et al., 2010). Fusaroli et al. (2013) thus investigated
if the statistical complexities of behaviors would match between
two interacting humans, and if so, according to the physical mod-
els, the degree of complexity matching would predict information
transfer to be optimal. Already Fusaroli et al. (2012) were look-
ing for a functional relationship between the degree of matching
of a particular behavior and the accompanying performance out-
come; however, the use of complex systems physicalmodels creates
important divergences in the level of description and in the time
scales of subsequent analyses.
To estimate the multiscale complexity matching of human
behavior during interactions, Fusaroli et al. (2013) had to employ
yet a new unit of analysis, capturing more basic perceptuomo-
tor coupling between interlocutors. For this new unit they had to
ﬁrst assess the complexity (hierarchical scaling; cf. Abney et al.,
under review) and then the match in complexity between inter-
locutors, with the hypothesis that the more the complexity of
participants’ speech behavior matched, the higher the collab-
orative beneﬁt. They analyzed the physical basis or “skeleton”
of linguistic exchanges: the acoustic energy of speech events of
individuals in conversation. Onset/offset intervals of the acous-
tic signal from the conversations were extracted by identifying
boundaries between speech and pauses (pauses were deﬁned as
reduced acoustic intensity and the absence of pitch lasting beyond
20 ms). Binary spike trains of speech events were computed from
the onset/offset intervals; states were coded with “0s”; “1s” were
used to code changes in state, that is, the onset or offset of a
speech event. Thus, the unit of analysis was the onset/offset of
a speech event deﬁned by the presence or absence of particular
properties of acoustic energy. A temporal estimate of complexity
of human behavior was computed for each participant and each
joint conversation trial employing Allan Factor (AF, Allan, 1966),
a multiscale method for estimating the correlated clustering of
speech events12. Complexitymatchingwas deﬁned as the degree of
12The Allan factor analysis computes the correlation estimate – α – of the variance
of speech events at a particular time scale across multiple time scales. A scaling
relation, or power law, of speech events is evidenced when α∼ 1 whereas, and α∼ 0
is considered a Poisson process. The complexity of a participant’s speech behavior
is determined by the computation of α.
correlation between AF estimates of participants in a dyad. Across
all trials, the authors found a positive correlation between degree
of complexity matching and collective beneﬁt: when the complex-
ities of participants’ speech behaviors matched, collective beneﬁt
on the joint perceptual decision task was higher. These ﬁndings
can be interpreted as preliminary evidence for complexity match-
ing in interpersonal coordination (West et al., 2008): Increased
collective beneﬁt in a dyad can be considered an index of the opti-
mality of information transfer, which increased as a function of
the coordination of human behavior across multiple time scales.
In other words, the more ﬁne-tuned the turn-taking coordination
of the interlocutors, the better the information transfer, which
in turn led to a higher collective beneﬁt. Crucially, the degree of
complexity matching increased from the ﬁrst to the second half
of the experiment, suggesting that complexity matching express
the degree to which interlocutors adapt to coordinate with each
other.
This third study used a trial-by-trial measure that summa-
rized the multiscale properties of speech coordination in its very
basic form of acoustic energy. The overall unit of analysis was
the onset/offset of acoustic energy at a 10 ms time scale. This
ﬁne-grained analysis was then aggregated into a coarse-grained
analysis that operationalized the degree of complexity matching
between dyads. The degree of complexity matching was then cor-
related with collective beneﬁt computed for either all trials or
session-by-session.
Again, the questions regarding the microstructure of coordina-
tion cannot come from linguistic analysis or from aggregation
of perceptual decisions. Instead, it starts from a much more
ﬁne-grained level of analysis, speciﬁcally the dynamics of the
perceptuomotor structure of the task. Just as theories about
optimal decisions or linguistic alignment require selecting par-
ticular levels of description and analysis, here researchers choose
a ﬁner timescale and extract signals, which may be subject to
their own (but different) aggregation. Researchers who adopt
this theory often require very densely sampled behaviors to quan-
tify and characterize the dynamics that underpin some behavior
or cognitive process. Now quite different observations can be
made about the process of interaction, regarding the composi-
tion of the task in terms of the perceptuomotor coupling of its
participants.
The past three sections laid out sample re-analyses of the
Bahrami et al. (2010) dataset, with quite different goals in mind.
The upshot of this research scenario is to select disparate scales
of analysis, different means of measurement, and different pat-
terns of aggregation in order to assess particular predictions about
the cognitive system, or to characterize the cognitive system in
different ways at different levels. However, we do not mean to sug-
gest that these are completely independent levels of analysis (à la
Fodor, 1974, 1975; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). Instead, these pro-
cesses should be seen as interdependent, inspiring each other and
providing reciprocal insight. Indeed, Fusaroli et al. (2012, 2013)
already shows hints of this integration: The optimality of the joint
decision process can be correlatedwith the structure of the linguis-
tic interaction; similarly, the joint decision process and linguistic
structure itself may be related to the dynamics of the acous-
tic speech behaviors of dyad members, such as the correlation
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between complexity matching indices. In the next section, we dis-
cuss this potential integration more fully, noting that explanatory
pluralism also encourages this kind of synthesis across theoretical
domains.
SYNTHESIS OF LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Explanatory pluralism has been presented as a view intermedi-
ate between extreme forms of reductionism (where everything
ends up being physics) and anti-reductionism or strong auton-
omy (where different sciences are insulated from one another).
Above, we have seen a detailed example of explanatory plu-
ralism in practice, with three different studies approaching the
same phenomenon – joint decision-making by a pair of partic-
ipants engaged in a perceptual discrimination task – at differ-
ent temporal and spatial scales, using distinct methodological
tools.
In this section, we return to the topic of explanatory plural-
ism, and consider how this kind of approach works in practice.
First we discuss the beneﬁts of each level of description. Then
we discuss advantages of interactions between these levels, and
how syntheses between them can motivate new questions and
insights.
BENEFITS OF INDEPENDENT LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Against views which emphasize the value of a single paradigm
in cognitive science (e.g., reductionism in its most radical form,
which advocates focusing only on the physical level), explana-
tory pluralism holds that it is important to study phenomena
using multiple independent levels of analysis. We have seen
how the three levels discussed above are important to under-
standing performance in joint decision-making. Bahrami et al.
(2010) found that, when perceptual sensitivities were equal, dyads
beneﬁtted from interaction by comparing levels of conﬁdence.
Fusaroli et al. (2012) observed that group performance was higher
when interlocutors shared common task-relevant lexical pat-
terns during conversations about conﬁdence. Finally, Fusaroli
et al. (2013) provided evidence that group performance increased
when the hierarchical structure of the very basic patterns of
interlocutors’ vocalizations – with the base unit of the onset of
acoustic energy – matched within the dyad. These insights were
obtained while remaining within the relevant spatial and tempo-
ral scale and while making use of the characteristic tools of each
approach.
What if a more traditional approach were followed, which only
allowed for one way of analyzing joint decision-making? What
would be lost?
If “Approach 1” were pursued in isolation, we would not know
that the development and sharing of a linguistic conﬁdence scale
among members of a dyad makes a difference in the performance
in the task (Fusaroli et al., 2012). Furthermore, the performance of
the task is also successfully predicted by the hierarchical structure
of acoustic energy onsets (Fusaroli et al., 2013).
If “Approach 2” were pursued in isolation, we would not know
that the degree of matching in individual sensitivity is an impor-
tant drive in the efﬁcacy of conﬁdence sharing. Additionally,
we would not consider that the patterns of matching found in
local linguistic alignment might be complemented by more basic
patterns of matching of the hierarchical structures of acoustic
energy onsets.
Finally, if “Approach 3” were pursued in isolation, we would
not know that the rate of indiscriminate matching of lexical items
negatively predicts performance; the alignment of language not
functionally relevant for the particular context, does not help the
dyad. Additionally, we would never be able to consider the pos-
sibility that unequal perceptual capabilities of individuals might
have a signiﬁcant effect on group tasks and relatedly, how, in turn,
these asymmetries might affect linguistic-level and acoustic-level
matching dynamics.
These considerations support the idea that strong forms of
reductionism, which at times suggest outright elimination of all
but the lowest level physical sciences, are problematic. All three
approaches shed light on important features of joint decision-
making. Eliminating any of these approaches leaves important
features of the phenomenon unexplained. The synthesis of these
three levels provides a more complete description of how people
work together to solve a particular task.
BENEFITS OF INTERDEPENDENT LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Against views like strong anti-reductionism or “siloism”, which
advocate that different levels of analysis be completely autonomous,
we believe that multiple theories should interact when describing
the same phenomenon (cf. Simon, 1992). To make a case for this
idea, we ﬁrst consider what would be missing from a description of
joint perceptual decision-making if the different approaches did
not interact with each other.
If none of these three approaches informed each other, various
research opportunities crossing scales and mixing methods would
be lost. For example, can people with asymmetric perceptual
capabilities effectively overcome their difference by communicat-
ing about common environmental constraints (Approach 1) and
what do the language properties (Approach 2) look like when they
successfully coordinate? Additionally, does local linguistic align-
ment or global convergence of linguistic coordination (Approach
2) relate to the matching of hierarchical structures at the level of
acoustic energy onsets (Approach 3)? Finally, how does the degree
of matching of hierarchical structures of acoustic energy onsets
(Approach 3) relate to different dyad-level perceptual asymme-
tries (Approach 1)? All of these questions pertain to the corpus
of data described in the present case study, and indeed some
of these questions are currently being tested. What is impor-
tant to understand is that all three levels are describing the same
phenomenon, and there are certainly more levels of description
that can be included. Asking these cross-level questions might
persuade some to argue for reductionism, e.g., “does linguis-
tic alignment just merely reduce to complexity matching?” or
“how does linguistic alignment interact with dyad-level percep-
tual asymmetries?”We suggest that there is interdependence across
levels, where theories can inform each other, ultimately leading to
a better understanding of the phenomenon. Having an epistemo-
logical process prioritizing the interdependence across different
levels stands in contrast to views suggesting that each level is inde-
pendent, autonomous and represents competing explanations of
a phenomenon and that higher levels can be reduced to lower
levels.
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TOPICS FOR FURTHER WORK IN EXPLANATORY PLURALISM
We have argued for explanatory pluralism using a detailed case
study. However, it is important to point out that not all levels of
description are complementary, and the principle of “more lev-
els of description is better” is problematic if applied haphazardly
and without a proper supporting framework. While a plurality
of approaches is necessary to better explain a given phenomenon,
not all approaches are equal: At what point does the diffusion
toward a troubled eclecticism stop? We have earlier suggested three
methods: (1) conceptual analysis, (2) data-driven statistical model
comparison, and (3) experimental manipulations. This paper is
an example of the ﬁrst: we have assessed three approaches to the
same phenomenon (and dataset) articulating their differences and
complementarity. A data-driven statistical model comparison –
which is outside of the scope of this paper – would comparatively
assess the relation between the models and between the models
and the data. In other words, it would look at the comparative
explanatory power of individual performance, linguistic align-
ment and complexity matching: Do they equally ﬁt the data? Do
they explain comparable amount of variance in the data? Dowe get
better statistical ﬁt and explanatory power by integrating individ-
ual performance, linguistic alignment and complexity matching
in the same model and how do they interact? An experimental
approach could push these comparisons further by investigating
the causal relations between parameters and opening new venues
of inquiry. For example, if we systematically vary one of the
parameters (e.g., similarity in individual performance, by intro-
ducing noise in the stimuli presented to the worse performer in
a dyad), how do the others vary in their levels and relation to
performance?
In conclusion, if the goal of a scientiﬁc endeavor (e.g.,
understanding decision-making of pairs of humans) is to fully
understand and thus predict future behaviors, then taking into
account multiple levels and theoretical approaches is warranted if
not necessary.
We have provided a conceptual treatment of what explanatory
pluralism looks like in cognitive science. Although beyond the
scope of the current paper, we also advocate the use of data-driven
statistical model comparison and experimental manipulations
to critically assess the interest and complementarity of different
approaches. Indeed, some of us (Fusaroli and Tylén, under review)
have already implemented this technique.
Additionally, we introduced two beneﬁts of practicing explana-
tory pluralism in scientiﬁc investigations: top-down constraining
and bottom-up scaffolding. Both beneﬁts provide frameworks that
may lead to future research questions about a particular phe-
nomenon. Again, top-down constraining uniﬁes multiple levels
of analysis by identifying the longer-scaled levels as contextual
constraints for the smaller-scaled levels. For example, Approach 1
provided contextual constraints for the linguistic tools (Approach
2) participantsmight utilize, and therefore, the patterns of acoustic
energy (Approach 3). This framework affords the identiﬁcation of
contextual inﬂuences of a phenomenon not otherwise integrated
across multiple levels of analysis.
Bottom-up scaffolding can be used to identify what can
emerge from lower-level patterns. For example, the lexical items
participants jointly use and align (Approach 2) emerge from the
multiscale patterns of acoustic energy (Approach 3). Furthermore,
an optimal model of joint perceptual decision-making, requir-
ing the sharing of conﬁdence (Approach 1), is comprised of the
lexical items (Approach 2). Again, it is the substrates of lower
levels of analysis that afford the possibility for higher-level com-
ponents – via higher levels of analysis – of a phenomenon to
emerge.
CONCLUSION
We have defended explanatory pluralism using a case study,
which involved three separate analyses of the same phenomenon.
We have made the case that integrating data and theory from
multiple scales of analysis provides a fuller explanation of a
cognitive phenomena than would be possible if we pursued a
more traditional, theoretically autonomous style of scientiﬁc
investigation.
Our call is for more researchers in the cognitive and behavioral
sciences to consider studying phenomena of interest using the
framework of explanatory pluralism. This can encompass a vari-
ety of practices ranging from conceptual analysis to full ﬂedged,
data-driven analysis. Acknowledging that theoretical approaches
inﬂuence methodological decisions and practices, we argue that
explanatory pluralism might be beneﬁcial to the ultimate scientiﬁc
endeavor of explanation.
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